Umwelt: Ecosystem of Posthuman Distributed Cognition C.S.퍼스와 기호학

* This paper was presented at the 3rd World Humanities Forum, Daejeon Convention Center, Korea, 2014


 Umwelt: Ecosystem of Posthuman DistributedCognition

 

Kang Mijung (AICT, Seoul National University)

 

1. Introduction: Ping Body and Posthuman Distributed Cognition

 

Arobotic artist, Stelarcs PingBody (1996, Figure 1) vividly shows a self-portrait of posthuman. Through The Third Hand (1981, Figure 2),Stelarc who is connected to the network, gives himself to involuntarymovements. Those who watch Stelarcs performance Ping Body have to be regarded as both an audience and a group ofperformers of Ping Body. After theparticipants let Stelarc know their internet address beforehand, different pingcommands are randomly sent to each internet domain.[1] When ping commands (0 to 2,000 milliseconds)are converted to voltage ranging from 0 to 60 volts, the audience canparticipate in the work Ping Body bystimulating Stelarcs body muscles via the touch interface thatexpresses human body movements. Not only was Stelarcs body attached to prosthesis physically strengthened,but he could also obtain an extended self with distributed cognition byconnecting to other bodies on networks.

 

Figure 1. Stelarc, Ping Body (1996)

Figure 2. Stelarc, The Third Hand (1980)

 

Itwould be better to understand the Stelarcs body combined with prosthesis and hisperformance as a new phase of evolving human, rather than as the end ofbiological body.[2] In Stelarcs view who agrees to the standpoint of MarshallMcLuhan in Understanding Media, Homosapiens have always used tools or artifacts and made them a part of their body.As Gregory Bateson comprehended, a blind mans stick is a part of his body.[3] A deaf mans hearing-aid or a highly shortsighted mans glasses play a similar roleas an element of embodied subject. Then, Stelarcs the ThirdHand can be seen as an extended body more evolved than the stick,hearing-aid or glasses. In other words, Stelarcs body with prosthesis helps widen the scope ofhis experiences to a greater extent than the stick did for its user, a blind man.If we do not acknowledge the existence of disembodied mind as argued byHumberto Maturana and F.J. Varela,[4] it wont be difficult to understand that Stelarc wouldhave experienced distribution and expansion of cognitive self by using the newbody part, the Third Hand.

 

InHow We Became Posthuman (1999),Katherine Hayles suggests a retroactive definition of human and posthuman. As Hayles points out, people who have a terrorwitnessing the evolution of intelligent machines pay attention to a connotationof the word post as the end.[5] Like Stelarc, she refutes opinions that thedevelopment of body combined with machines and cyborg will bring the end ofhumanity. Such terror stems from liberal humanism that was conceived at the Ageof Enlightenment. Humanism based on Descartes dualism holds a position that humanity isdependent on the freedom of mind, not the corporeality of body. Those whoembrace posthuman as a pleasure not a fear cannot be also free from thedualistic humanism in that they also consider that the mind is superior to thebody. If posthuman implies the notion of the end, it would be, as Hayles put it, it signals instead the end of acertain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best,to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure toconceptualize themselves as autonomous beingexercising their will through individual agency and choice. [6]

 

Inthis paper, I would like to take an epistemological approach to posthuman basedon Umwelt theory ofJakob von Uexküll, atheoretical biologist. Uexküll,who was also a zoologist, defines the umweltas the perceptual world in which an organism exists and acts as a subjectand tries semiotic analysis on the umwelt. The aim of this paper is to probedeeply into the epistemological situation that Hayles called posthumandistributed cognitionrelying on Uexkülls Umwelt theory.Discussions to be developed from Chapter two will explore the issues ofposthuman epistemology by looking into UexküllsUmwelt theory and several issues regarding cybernetics.

 

2. Jakob von UexküllsUmwelt Theory

Uexkülls Umwelt theoryhas had a profound influence on the history of cybernetics. Before moving intohow Uexküll contributedto formation of cybernetics, let me explore what Umwelt theory is. "Umwelt" is a term coined by Uexküll meaning the a subjectiveuniverse and phenomenal world that a livingorganism perceives or aself-centered worldthat an organism experiences.[7] Umwelt issubjective experience, but it doesntmean that the experience of Umwelt is individual-specific and unique. To beaccurate, an Umwelt is a public realm within each species shared by allindividuals of that species. In this regard, it is more corresponding to Uexkülls scientificstance to regard Umwelt as the objective world.[8] As life is notjust about matter but also howthat matter interacts in interconnected systems that include organisms in theirseparately perceived worlds,[9] Umwelt is morelike a perceivable, significant world surrounding each organism. That doesnt mean thatUmwelt is the environment surrounding organisms. The reason why Uexküll created theword Umwelt is todistinguish the phenomenal world from the general surroundings of organism (Umgebung).[10] Since Umwelt is defined as the phenomenalworld of perception for an organism, the Umwelt of a honeybee and the Umwelt ofa human cannot help being different.

 

Uexküllviewed how an organism perceives or interprets and how it reacts is mostimportant in every state of life process, and for this reason he adopted asemiotic method in biological research. As mentioned earlier, the Umwelt is theself-world that each biological organism perceives. According to Uexküll, a realityappears in such a world. Put it differently, all living creatures perceive thereality that appears in Umwelt through their sensory organs. Elements ofreality form all subjects and their subjective self-world, and at the sametime, go through constant changes while maintaining harmony.[11] Uexküll mentionedthat such ultimate reality is the nature. To Uexküll who saw thatthe nature is always represented by signs, and the signs that bridgecommunication between the nature and mind are regarded as true existence.

 

Itcan be surmised from the above mentioned Uexkülls realism, thelaws of nature correspond with the law of sign process. The biologist Uexküll thought thatthe main function of mind is to accept and interpret signs, so the mind is anorgan created by nature to perceive and interpret nature.[12] The reason whyUexküll could developsuch semiotic biology even though he was not aware of C.S. Peirce's andFerdinand de Saussuressemiotics is because he noted an analogy between the sign processes in natureand in language.[13] In Umwelttheory, the formula of reciprocal relationship between nature and man issurprisingly similar to the linguistic formula of the relationship betweenlanguage and man. As nature, which has created man, can exist only when maninterprets nature, man has created language while language can create man.

 

Uexkülls theoreticalbiology was deeply influenced by Immanuel Kant. Umwelt can be equated to natureas the ultimate reality is not because the elements that compose the Umwelthave "objective" qualities but because those qualities are alwaysunderstood by subjects who perceive the elements of Umwelt represented bysigns. Uexküll draw thecontour of Umwelt theory based on Kantsphilosophy that the qualities ofall things are not their own, but of our own projected perception.[14] In line withKantsinvestigations, he describes the task of biology as follows. The first task isto consider the part played by our body, and especially by our sensory organsand central nervous system. The second is to study the other subjects'relations to their objects.[15] In other words, the point of Uexkülls theoreticalbiology is, first, to study human, the primary receptor of signs, and the humanmind and then to investigate the roles of other subjects or animals asreceptors of signs.

 

Uexküll who established the Umwelt theory by adoptingKants philosophy laid a key theoretical foundationfor the history of cybernetics by understanding the life process of nature asthe sign process which is comparable to semiotic function of language, andintroducing "functional cycle." Let me explores several issuesregarding cybernetics focusing on their relation with Uexkülls Umwelt theory. 

 

 

3. Umwelt and Cybernetics

 

Often,cybernetics is translated into 인공두뇌학(Artificial Brainology) in Korean, which might create amisunderstanding. A mathematician Norbert Wiener introduced the term cybernetics to refer to the scientificstudy of control mechanism that maintains a stable system in the animal and themachine or in organic and inorganic substance. Since Wiener defined cyberneticsas the scientific study of control andcommunication in the animal and the machine in his book Cybernetics in 1948, the field of study has developed takingtransdisciplinary approach from biology and computer engineering to cognitivetheories of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. In the history ofcybernetics, Uexkülls contributioncannot be overlooked. For instance, while Weiner made artificial automata acase of physiology based on mathmatics and technology, what Uexküll pursued inhis Umwelt theory is to bring the function of living organisms to automatatheory.[16] This was made possible since Uexküll held thesemiotic point of view that made him see the natural phenomenon similar to thelinguistic elements. Through a semiotic biology study, he suggested a viewpointto draw an analogy between the life process of organisms and theself-controlled system of artifacts. The case in point is his explanation on functional cycle which presentedthe feedback principle, the core of cybernetics, 20 years earlier than NorbertWiener. 

 

Thegist of Umwelt study can be found in Uexkülls point thatorganisms basically have communication system. According to Uexküll, thefunctional cycle is a voluntary mechanism that stably maintains the life systemof creatures, especially animals that respond to the nature. Influenced byKant, Uexküll sets Innenwelt, a subjective inner world oforganisms, and distinguishes it from Umweltthat is a perceptive world of organisms.[17] However, Umwelt is also a world perceived bysubjects, it cannot be unknowable Ding an sich or thing-in-itself. The mechanism of functional cycle is based ona single, interactive organic system of receptors and effectors which performdifferent functions.

 

Figure 3. The functional cycle

Asyou can see in Figure 3 above, the functional cycle is composed of interactionbetween the perceptual field equipped with receptors and the motor field witheffectors. Here, we should not jump to a conclusion that reactive or operativeactivities are conscious while perceptive ones are spontaneous. Perceptiondirects the first stage of meaning-utilization and operation refers to thesecond stage of confirming what is perceived. The subject as meaning-utilizerconsists of a receptor organ and an effector organ, and the object as themeaning-carrier is differentiated into a perceptual cue carrier and anoperational cue carrier. ToUexküll, there is noneutral object. The Umwelt of an observer has a significant influence on theUmwelt of its object under observation. For instance, lets say azoologist observes a dolphin. The subjective world of the zoologist forms thecore of the self-world of the dolphin that is under observation.[18]

 

Uexkülls functionalcycle model was suggested to take a semiotic approach to study the life ofanimals and humans. His Umwelt theory including the functional cycle would beuseful to elucidate the perceptual worlds of organisms as well as to identifyepistemological and ontological aspects of artificial life and cyborg that areinorganic matters. To reach such conclusion, I believe that it would be helpfulto take a look into the history and main issues of cybernetics, which arerelevant to this paper.

 

Cyberneticsinaugurated by Norbert Wiener in the mid-20th century had a lofty goal ofestablishing communication and control theory that can be applicable toanimals, humans and machines alike. Besides Norbert Wiener, Claude Shannon, anexpert of information theory, and Warren McCulloch who established a neuralfunction model and many others played a key role in the early days ofcybernetics. After the period, the humans have been understood asinformation-processing entities who are essentially similar to intelligentmachines. All researchers who contributed to the inception of cyberneticsplaced a strong emphasis on homeostasis. Homeostasis had been understood as theability of living organisms to maintain metabolic equilibrium when they arebuffeted by fickle environments. The pioneers of cybernetics tried to extendthe concept of homeostasis, which is the basic feature of organisms, into theartificial automata. Such extension was possible because the feedback loops that had long been exploitedto increase the stability of mechanical systems, was explicitly theorized as aflow of information.[19]

 

Althoughthe informational feedback loop was initially linked with homeostasis, itquickly led to the idea of reflexivity. Reflexivity can be defined as the movement whereby thatwhich has been used to generate a system is made, through a changedperspective, to become part of the system it generates.[20] As illustrated in Kurt Gödels theory ofnumber, M.C. Eschers drawings and Jorge LuisBorges novels, reflexivity refers toa situation where creating a system is entangled with the system itself.Reflexivity has entered cybernetics primarilythrough discussions about the observer in the system. First-wave cyberneticsconsidered observers are outside the system and information flows from thesystem to the observers. But feedback can also loop through the observers,drawing them into becoming a part of the system being observed.[21] In short, the observers ofthe system can be a system that is observed.

 

Thefeedback loop that plays a pivotal role in information theory together withcybernetics is very much similar to the functional cycle that Uexküll suggestedearlier in 1920s. Umwelt is a world composing of an observing subject and anobserved object, but it is not an absolutely objective world, but a subjectiveworld as perceived by subjects. Yet, Umwelt is not just a subjective world, butinter-subjectively perceived world. The reason why the subjects and objects ofUmwelt interact is that the subjectswith their own Innenwelt take parts in the Umwelt and perceive and react tosigns in a certain time and space.

 




 4. Posthuman Distributed Cognition System

 

As mentioned before, the researchers of cybernetics adopted the principle of feedback loop for introducing the idea of homeostasis to mechanical control system. In the meanwhile, it was discovered that homeostasis of self-control system can be lead to reflexivity. In 1980s, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela established a self-organization theory of organisms based on the study of reflexivity in sensory processing and the dynamics of autonomous biological systems. [22] According to the researchers, organisms respond to their environment in ways determined by their internal self-organization. Their one and only goal is to produce and reproduce continually the organization that defines them as systems. Hence, they not only are self-organizing but also are autopoietic, or self-making.

 

After 1980s, discourses on artificial life swelled into existence when self-organization began to be understood not merely as the (re)production of internal organization but as the springboard to emergence. Computer programmers designed creatures that evolve spontaneously in directions they may not have anticipated, and argued that such self-evolving programs are not merely models of life but are themselves alive. The premise that alllife forms and the whole universe are composed of information made this claim plausible. Since 1953 when James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA, decoding the human genome became possible. As the forms of life were recognized as information patterns and the distinction between biological life and artificial life became blurry, so-called posthuman discourse began in earnest.

 

As I suggested at the beginning, the terror from the emergence of posthuman stems from epistemology based on the metaphysics of presence which was criticized by Derrida. If we think out of the box of modern human thinking that gives superiority to the presence of Logos or mind overabsence and move to the postmodern or posthuman thinking composed of patterns / randomness, as Hayles did, we could open up new ways ofseeing what being human means. Randomness or complexity evolves toward an open future marked by contingency and unpredictability. Thats because randomness is not just the lack of patterns but as the creative ground from which patterncan emerge.[23] By shifting from presence/absence model to pattern/randomness model, randomness seems to have an abundant role to play. In Embodied Mind, Varela and his coauthors argue that there is no stable, coherent self but only autonomous agents running programs.[24] These agents are not the mental subjects that can download itself into a computer as Hans Moravec imagined.[25] Rather, they are subjects as the embodied minds that constantly change by communicating with the world of complexity and unpredictability. From the posthuman point of view, it is a certain conception of human from the liberal humanist viewpoint, not the humanity itself that faces the end.

 

In epistemology which had been dominant during the modern period, humans were identified with the world of consciousness of single self that can make clear and distinct judgment as suggested by Descartes. In contrast, the cognitive system of human subject in posthuman thinking can be expressed as distributed cognition. Edwin Hutchin addressed the idea of distributed cognition by giving an answer to John SearleChinese room puzzle.[26] Hutchin made a neat interpretation that it is not Searle but the entire Chinese room, namely the system that knows Chinese. Modern people are capable of more sophisticated cognition than cavemen not because moderns are smarter, Hutchin concludes, but because they have constructed smarter environments in which to work. From his point of view, cognition and decision-making is not reserved for humans alone. Cognition is distributed to various agents ranging from the blind mans stick mentioned in the chapter 1 to smart phone and highly complicated steering system of a navy vessel. As Stelarcthe Third Hand was given as an extreme example, humans will live a life in partnership with more and more intelligent machines. As Hayles made a good point, the prospect of humans working in partnership with intelligent machines is not so much an usurpation of human right and responsibility as it is a further development in the construction of distributed cognition environment which has been evolved for thousands of years.

 

Before finishing the paper, let me summarize the topics of discussion that I mentioned at the beginning. How the Umwelt that Uexküll defined as the phenomenal world of living organisms, especially animals, can be the ecosystem of posthuman distributed cognition including artificial intelligence? Didnt Uexküll as a biologist suggest Umwelt to distinguish organisms and non-organism?[27] In the next chapter, I would like to sum up this paper by delving more elaborate answer from Claus Emmeches study on biosemiotics. I believe Emmeches study will give a strong back-up to Hayles argument.

 

5. Conclusion: Umwelt and Biosemiotics

 

Hayles discussed the posthuman epistemology, focusing on posthuman as human beings articulated with intelligent machines not as robots or cyborgs. To forecast the future of posthuman, we need to draw a distinction between the changing modes of embodiment of humans and themodes of embodied artificial intelligence similar to human, i.e., cyborgs or androids.

 

Emmeche claims that a robot can have an Umwelt like animals or humans.[28] It doesnt mean that he gives the same epistemological status to organisms and non-organisms. Instead, he founds his own biosemiotics position, qualitative organicism, based on C.S. Peirces semiotics and distinguishes it from traditional organicism. In qualitative organicism, Emmeche categorizes the types of embodiment and investigates the plausibility that a robot can have an Umwelt.

 

He distinguishes an organism, the object of biological observation, and the body which is biological and social at the same time and suggests the four different categories of embodiments as follows: physical, organismic, animate and anthropic embodiments.[29] Physical embodiment refersto all sorts of bodies governed by thermodynamics and organismic embodiment means the embodied body of all organisms including vegetative body. Animate embodiment indicates the level of embodiment that enables the perception and action of animals, which was the main interest ofUexküll, and anthropic embodiment refers to the ontological status of human and artificial life such as robot that enact both biological and social roles. Put it simply, Uexkülls Umwelt extends to the epistemology of intelligence machines in the anthropic embodiment.

 

Even though anthropic embodiment of both human and intelligent machines constitutes social roles, Emmeche notes that the two forms should be distinguished. He explains that societal embodiment of the quasi-autonomous body such as cyborg body is a special form of human-social embodiment and it is intrinsically connected to technology dissolving sharp body/machine boundaries. Though cyborgs cannot be simplyconsidered as social in the sense of being social animals as Aristotles description of human as a political animal, cyborgs are emphaticallyhuman-social, being part of a society with division of labor, institutional subsystems, social roles, cultures, etc. [30] Also, considering humans are evolving into the societal body dependent upon technology, the justification to clearly distinguish the embodiment of human and cyborg will be much slighter.

 

Emmeche could apply Uexkülls Umwelt theory to artificial machines like robots since he was inspired by semiotics of Peirce who expanded the sign process or the scope of semiosis[31] to behavioral reactions of animals and even to all physical phenomena beyond human communication. In the context of Pierces semiotics, the sign process does occur even if there is no subject to interpret sign. For instance, even if a subject, whether it being human or animal, does not interpret, the lightning is a sign that thunder will follow, and the fossils of dinosaurs are the signs that dinosaurs existed in the past.

 

In Peirces Synechistic principle that regards the things of the world as exist in a continuum, a distinction between organisms and non-organisms is meaningful only when dealing with narrower issues. In other words, in Peirces viewpoint, Umwelt theory that can be seen as a case of semiosis basically does not carry different implications from the feedback loop of machines. Keeping in mind that the human embodiment has not only biological meaning but also social and cultural-anthropologic meanings, physical differences between humans and intelligent machines are imperceptible compared to semiotic continuity of both entities.

 

Although Uexküll has developed the idea of Umwelt based on animal studies, he postulated Umwelt for all creatures including plants. If presuming that humans can have their own Umwelt distinctive from other animals is possible, it is plausible to discuss the Umwelt of intelligent machines in this context. If the prosthetic present closely related to technology is heading to the future of artificial lives such as robots as independently existing entitiesthe contemplation on the Umwelt of artificial machine as a form of evolved human species would provide us withsignificant implications, whether we call it the human ecosystem or posthuman ecosystem.

 

References

Bateson, Gregory, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Jason Aronson Inc., 1972(1987)

Deely, John, Semiotics and Jakob von Uexkülls Concept of Umwelt, Sign Systems Studies, 32:1, 2004

Emmeche, Claus, Does a robot have an Umwelt?: Reflections on the qualitative biosemiotics of Jakob von Uexkull, Semiotica, 134:1, 2001

_________, A Biosemiotic Note on Organisms, Animals, Machines, cyborgs, and the Quasi-autonomy of Robots, Pragmatics & Cognition 15:3, 2007

Hayles, K.N., How We Became Posthuman, The University of Chicago Press, 1999

Hoffmeyer, Jesper, Biosemiotics: Towards a New Synthesis in Biology, European Journal for Semiotic Studies, 9:2, 1997

Kull, Kalevi, On Semiosis, Umwelt, and Semiosphere, Semiotica, 120:3, 1998

_________, Jakob von Uexküll: An Introduction Semiotica, 134, 2001

Lagerspetz, Karl, Y.H., Jakob von Uexküll and the origins of cybernetics, Semiotica, 134:1, 2001

Maturana, Umberto, et al. Der Baum der erkenntness (Choi Hoyoung, Trans.). Galmuli Publishing, 2007

Maturana , Humberto and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, D. Reidel, 1980

Moravec, Hans, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence, Harvard University Press, 1988, pp. 109-110

Peirce, C.S., The Essential Peirce 1, 2, Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998

Smith, Marquard (ed.), STELARC: The Monograph, The MIT Press, 2007

Varela, F.J. et al., The Embodied Mind, The MIT Press, 1993

von Uexküll, Jakob, A Foray into the worlds of Animals and Humans, trans by Joseph D. ONeil, University of Minesota Press, 2010

von Uexküll, Thure, The Sign Theory of Jakob von Uexküll. Krampen et al. (ed.), Classics of Semiotics. New York: Plenum, 1987

von Uexküll, Thure, et al, Endosemiotics, Semiotica, 96:1, 1993

Yakhlef, Ali, Towards a Post-human Distributed Cognition Environment, Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 6, 2008

PING. Terms Korea. Nov.1999. Web. Sep. 2014. <http://www.terms.co.kr>.



[1] PING (Packet Internet Groper) is a basic internet program that determines whether a specific IP address is accessible and it can accept a query. PING is used to diagnose how fast the internet host that the user tries to access is running. PING can not only test how quick IP host responds to the packet, but also it can find IP address of the website only with its domain name. It works by sending a packet to the specified address and waiting for a reply. See PING. Terms Korea. Nov.1999. Web. Sep. 2014. <http://www.terms.co.kr>.      

[2] Jane Goodall, The Will to Evolve, in Marquard Smith (ed.), STELARC: The Monograph, The MIT Press, 2007, pp. 1-7.

[3] Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Jason Aronson Inc., 1972(1987), p. 251

[4] Humberto Maturana, et al. (2007). Der Baum der erkenntness (Choi Hoyoung, Trans.). Galmuli Publishing.; F.J. Varela, et al., The Embodied Mind, The MIT Press, 1993.

[5] K.N. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, The University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 283

[6] Hayles, ibid., p. 286

[7] Thure von Uexküll, The Sign Theory of Jakob von Uexküll. Krampen et al. (ed.), Classics of Semiotics. New York: Plenum, 1987, pp.148-149

[8] The Umwelt theory of Uexküll who has his own phenomenological position cannot be understood with the subject-object dichotomy and a split from modern thought is needed. To him, subject belongs to the world of things and objects are perceivable and actually intelligible. It short, that an Umwelt is an exclusively objective world, not because it does not involve things, but because it involves things only in known aspects. See John DeelySemiotics and Jakob von Uexkülls Concept of Umwelt, Sign Systems Studies, 32:1, 2004, pp. 13-20

[9] Dorion Sagan, Introduction  Umwelt After Uexküll, in Jacob von Uexküll, A Foray into the worlds of Animals and Humans, trans by Joseph D. ONeil, University of Minesota Press, 2010, p. 1

[10] Thure von Uexküll et al, Endosemiotics, Semiotica, 96:1, 1993, p. 6

[11] Thure von Uexküll, op. cit., pp. 148-149

[12] Thure von Uexküll, ibid., p. 149

[13] Thure von Uexküll, ibid., pp. 149-151

[14] Thure von Uexküll, ibid., p. 154

[15] Jacob von Uexküll, Theoretishe Biologie, Reprint of second edition of 1928, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, 9f (Thure von Uexküll, ibid., p. 154).

[16] Karl, Y.H., Lagerspetz, Jakob von Uexküll and the origins of cybernetics, Semiotica, 134:1, 2001, p. 643

[17] Lagerspetz, ibid, p. 647

[18] Thure von Uexküll, op. cit., pp.162-166

[19] Hayles, op. cit., p. 8

[20] Hayles, ibid, p. 8

[21] Hayles, ibid, p. 9

[22] Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, D. Reidel, 1980

[23] Hayles, op. cit., p. 286

[24] F.J. Varela, et al., The Embodied Mind, The MIT Press, 1993

[25] Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence, Harvard University Press, 1988, pp. 109-110

[26] Hayles, op. cit, p. 288-289; John Searle suggested Chinese room as a case to challenge the idea that machines, like humans, can think. He said that he will be able to communicate in Chinese by referring to textbooks in the Chinese room even if he knows not a word of Chinese. John Searl, Minds, Brains and Science, Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 32-41

[27] Thure von Uexküll, op. cit., p. 152

[28] See Claus Emmeche, Does a robot have an Umwelt?: Reflections on the qualitative biosemiotics of Jakob von Uexkull, Semiotica, 134:1, 2001

[29] Claus Emmeche, A Biosemiotic Note on Organisms, Animals, Machines, cyborgs, and the Quasi-autonomy of Robots, Pragmatics & Cognition, 15:3, 2007, pp. 468-472

[30] Emmeche, ibid., p. 471

[31] Semiosis is a neologism coined by Peirce to refer to the continuous process of sign interpretations that involves signs, objects and interpretant. An interpretant doesnt refer to an interpreter, but an interpreted meaning in relation to the object of sign. 


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